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Abstract Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered inside an attitude ascrip-
tion, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a
preceding belief ascription. This poses amajor challenge for presupposition theory and
the semantics of attitude ascriptions. I solve the problem by enriching the semantics of
attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and
interpretation of mental states. In particular, I propose a DRT-based representation of
mental states with a global belief-layer and a variety of labeled attitude compartments
embedded within it. Hence, desires and other non-doxastic attitudes are asymmetri-
cally dependent on beliefs. I integrate these mental state representations into a general
semantic account of attitude ascriptions which relies on the parasitic nature of non-
doxastic attitudes to solve Karttunen’s puzzle.
Keywords Attitude ascriptions · Belief/desire reports · Presupposition ·
Mental states · DRT
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To capture the seemingly erratic projection behavior of presuppositions in complex
sentences, Karttunen (1973) proposes a classification of embedding environments.
Negation, for instance, is a hole: all presuppositions of a sentence ϕ are inherited by
¬ϕ. For example, the king of France is not bald presupposes that there is a king of
France. Conditionals are filters: a presupposition of ϕ may be “canceled” when ϕ
occurs in a configuration of the form ψ → ϕ. More specifically, filtering in such a
configuration occurs precisely when ψ entails a presupposition of ϕ. For example, If
France has a king, the king of France is bald does not presuppose the existence of a
king of France. Finally, environments that systematically cancel all presuppositions
of clauses embedded within them are called plugs. Karttunen puts verbs of saying
with clausal complements in this category. For instance, Harry has promised Bill to
introduce him to the king of France does not presuppose that France has a king.
In the final sections of the paper Karttunen turns to attitude ascriptions. Does the
presupposition that it was raining survive the embedding in (1)?
(1) Bill {believes/hopes} that it stopped raining.
After considering some confounding factors, he cautiously suggests a positive answer
and hence “it appears feasible to maintain the view that believe and other similar
propositional attitude verbs are holes”.
Karttunen concludes the section with a discussion of the following example1:
(2) Bill believed that Fred had been beating his wife and he hoped that Fred would
stop beating her.
[
Karttunen 1973, ex. (42)
]
If attitude embeddings are holes, the second conjunct on its own would presuppose
that Fred had been beating his wife. Clearly, (2) as a whole does not presuppose this, so
it must have been filtered out. But, according to Karttunen’s own proposal, filtering in
conjunctions only occurs if the first conjunct entails the presupposition of the second,
which is not the case here. Karttunen thus retracts the premise, and concludes that
hope and other attitude verbs are plugs.
But if attitude verbs are plugs, how do we explain the common intuition that pre-
suppositions tend to escape attitude embeddings like (1) (cf. e.g. Gazdar 1979; van der
Sandt 1992; Geurts 1998; Maier 2010; Romoli and Sudo 2009)? I will maintain the
standard position that presuppositions tend to project out of attitude ascriptions. The
puzzle therefore is how to account for the observed presupposition cancellation in
(2). In my view, this problem transcends presupposition theory narrowly construed.
Instead, it requires an examination of the semantics of belief and desire ascriptions
in discourse (Sects. 4–5), which in turn requires an examination of the structure of
mental states (Sect. 3).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 I first recast Karttunen’s puzzle
more precisely in modern presupposition-theoretic terms. I then critically evaluate
Heim’s influential solution, pointing out where the current proposal will improve
upon hers.
1 Karttunen ascribes the observation to John Lawler.
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In Sect. 3 I work out a concrete proposal for the logical representation of mental
states. The framework builds on Kamp’s work on the representation of attitudes in
DRT (Kamp 1990). A key feature of my proposal is that non-doxastic attitudes are
represented as embedded in—and hence asymmetrically dependent on—beliefs.
In Sect. 4 I turn to the interpretation of attitude ascriptions in natural language.
Fitting the mental state representations developed above into a DRT account of pre-
supposition projection and belief reports will shed new light on the classical de re/de
dicto distinction. For attitude ascriptions other than belief, I predict a third reading,
the so-called de credito (Yanovich 2011). On the current approach, both Karttunen’s
puzzle and this attested de credito reading are essentially linguistic manifestations of
the underlying “parasitic” nature of non-doxastic attitudes.
In Sect. 5 I move from simple, single sentence ascriptions to discourses. I propose
an extension of the standard resolution algorithmwhere partial attitude representations
ascribed to the same individual may be merged into a single, more precise represen-
tation. Applied to Karttunen’s puzzle, we merge a contextually established attitude
ascription (Bill believing that Fred has been beating his wife) with a second attitude
ascription (Bill hoping that Fred will stop beating her). Combined with the parasitic
representation of desire in a mental state description, this predicts precisely the pre-
supposition filtering that puzzled Karttunen.
2 Presupposition and propositional attitudes
In this section I reconstruct Karttunen’s puzzle in modern, dynamic presupposition
theory. This allows me to dismiss some potential simple solutions in Sect. 2.2. In Sect.
2.3 I challenge Heim’s (1992) more promising solution.
2.1 Karttunen’s puzzle
The use of the aspectual verb stop in an utterance of (3) triggers the presupposition
that Jane has been cheating on her husband. In other words, my use of (3) is only
felicitous if it is common ground between me and my audience that Jane was cheating
on her husband.
(3) Jane stopped cheating on her husband.
In dynamic semantics we formalize this as follows. Following Stalnaker (1970),
dynamic discourse interpretation is modeled in terms of successive updates to the
common ground, or “context”. Presuppositions function as restrictions on admissible
inputs for these updates. Concretely, an update of a context with (3) is only defined
if that context entails or “satisfies” the proposition that Jane has a husband and has
been cheating on him. If a context update is not defined the sentence is predicted to
be infelicitous in that context.
Next, as Karttunen and many others have observed, attitude ascriptions usually
inherit the presuppositions of their complements, i.e. (4), like (3), presupposes that
Jane in fact has a husband and has been cheating on him.
(4) Sue hopes that Jane stops cheating on her husband.
123
208 E. Maier
It is also verywell-established that a presupposition is “canceled”when it is entailed by
the relevant (global or local) context. The examples in (5) therefore do not presuppose
that Jane is cheating on her husband.
(5) a. Jane is cheating on her husband. Sue hopes Jane stops cheating on him.
b. Jane is cheating on her husband and Sue hopes Jane stops cheating on him.
c. If Jane is cheating on her husband, then Sue hopes Jane stops cheating on
her husband.
Dynamic presupposition theory describes the cancellations in (5) as follows. Take
(5a). Interpreting this mini-discourse means performing two successive updates on the
context. The first update adds the information that Jane is cheating on her husband.
The second update is defined iff the context entails the existence of such a cheating
event. But after the first update this information is satisfied, so the second update is
defined. No definedness requirement remains, so the presupposition has disappeared.
A similar story involving successive updates holds for (5b–c).2 Henceforth, we will
focus on simple satisfaction in discourses like (5a).
The puzzle is that the presupposition also disappears in a configuration like (6)
where the relevant context does not entail it:
(6) Sue thinks Jane cheated on her husband. She hopes Jane stops cheating on him.
In this example it doesn’t follow from the first sentence that Jane cheated on her
husband, so our theory predicts that the presupposition survives. But it doesn’t. The
discourse as a whole is felicitous in a context where the presupposition is not satisfied,
or even if it is common ground Sue is in fact mistaken about Jane’s alleged infidelity.
2.2 Initial diagnoses
Karttunen’s proposal that hope is a plug that simply annihilates all presuppositions
is clearly an ad hoc solution. It correctly predicts that no presupposition survives in
(6), but it goes against our intuition that presuppositions typically escape simple hope
embeddings like (4).
Since the local context embedded under the belief operator in the first sentence
clearly does satisfy the presupposition, it seems more natural to assume that somehow
that local context is responsible for filtering the presupposition. But how can that be?
My own answer below will start with the observation of an asymmetry between belief
and hope ascriptions with respect to presupposition satisfaction. Consider the contrast
in (7), involving the presupposition trigger too (associating with the focused element,
Sue, marked in small caps)3:
2 In dynamic semantics, (5b) is equivalent to (5a). The dynamic semantics of conditionals is more complex,
but in any case, the result is that in (5c) the consequent’s presupposition is filtered because it is entailed by
the antecedent.
3 The classical view, associated with Karttunen and Peters (1979), that too triggers a simple existential
presupposition, someone other than Sue came, is famously contested by Kripke (2009). In response, Heim
(1992) and van der Sandt and Geurts (2001) propose more sophisticated presuppositional analyses. In
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(7) a. John believes that Mary will come. He hopes that Sue will come too.
b. *John hopes that Mary will come. He believes that Sue will come too.
The key assumption of my account will be that this linguistic asymmetry mirrors
an underlying asymmetry in the logic of the attitudes themselves: desire and other
non-doxastic attitudes are parasitic on belief. But before delving into the structure
of attitudes, I first dismiss some other initial attempts at solving Karttunen’s puzzle.
Heim’s (1992) analysis is discussed in a separate subsection below.
Karttunen himself already dismisses one simple solution, which, however, seems to
work well for apparently similar cases of unexpected filtering in sequences of attitude
ascriptions like in (8):
(8) a. John believes that Mary used to smoke. He believes she stopped smoking
last year.
b. John hopes that Mary will come. He hopes that Sue will come too.
As before, the presupposition of the second ascription, thatMary used to smoke or that
someone other than Sue will come, respectively, is not entailed by the first ascription,
but intuitively it gets filtered out nonetheless. For a conjunction of ascriptions where
subject and mode of attitude are kept constant,4 Karttunen suggests that we could read
it as a single ascription at some level of logical form: John hopes that (Mary will come
and Sue will come too). In such a logical form, filtering is indeed predicted at the level
of the embedded conjunction. However, the original example, (6), is not amenable to
such a re-analysis because it involves two distinct attitudes: x believes that ϕ and x
hopes that ψ is not reducible to any single statement of the form x [attitude verb]s
that ϕ and ψ . It seems that the re-analysis strategy is a dead end.
Another possibility we might explore is that the observed cancellation is due to
local accommodation. Local accommodation means that a presupposition may get
added to a relevant local context to avoid infelicity. A classic example is (9), uttered
in a context where the interlocutors don’t know the guy they are talking about.
(9) A: I wonder why that guy is looking so glum.




In this case, local accommodation of the presupposition that he has a girlfriend under
the modal yields the most likely interpretation: maybe (he has a girlfriend and his
girlfriend jilted him).
Local accommodation appears to give the right result for the single mode sequences
in (8). For instance, (8b) would get truth-conditions paraphrasable as John hopes that
Footnote 3 continued
Sect. 5.4 I implement a version of the Geurts & van der Sandt approach. Since the analysis of too is an
independent issue I will just stick with the classical paraphrase for now.
4 As an anonymous reviewer points out, we see this type of filtering already when the attitude verbs are
“similar enough” but not identical, e.g. in believe–think or hope–want sequences. In the current paper I
simply ignore the finer distinctions among different doxastic attitudes/verbs and among different buletic
attitudes/verbs. To properly address this issue, future research will have to take into account more detailed
typologies of both attitudes and attitude ascribing verbs.
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Mary will come to his party and he hopes that someone other than Sue will come
to the party and that Sue will come. However, for the actual Karttunen puzzle, (6),
local accommodation yields Sue thinks Jane cheated on her husband and she hopes
that Jane cheated on her husband and stopped that cheating. On this reading it would
follow,5 quite counterintuitively, that Sue hopes that Jane cheated on her husband.
For an additional argument against the local accommodation strategy, note that
we observe Karttunen filtering with presupposition triggers that are known to resist
accommodation. The example in (7a) is a case in point, as it illustrates believe–hope
filtering with too, a well-known accommodation-resistant trigger (van der Sandt and
Geurts 2001; Kripke 2009).
In sum, we have examined and discarded three possible explanations for the
observed presupposition satisfaction inKarttunen’s example: analyzing hope as a plug,
rewriting sequences of attitude ascriptions as a single ascription, and local accommo-
dation. In the next section I reconstruct Heim’s solution.
2.3 Heim’s solution
In an influential paper, Heim (1992) has attempted to derive the puzzling projection
behavior of presuppositions in attitude contexts from her dynamic theory of presuppo-
sition satisfaction and some independent assumptions about the logical properties of
buletic attitudes. In order to better motivate my own alternative proposal I will briefly
review the main points of Heim’s analysis and point out some of its weaknesses that
the current proposal will improve upon.
2.3.1 Attitude ascriptions in context change semantics
Heim’s proposal is couched in a version of her own dynamic context change semantics.
A sentence ϕ is interpreted as an attempt to update the context C , modeled as a set
of possible worlds. Saying “It’s raining” removes all worlds where it’s not currently
raining from C . But such an update of C is only defined if all the (lexically triggered)
presuppositions associated with the sentence are satisfied in C .
To formalize this, assume that a static, intensional semantics is given. Notation:
ϕw = the truth value of ϕ in w; ϕ = the proposition expressed by ϕ = the set of
possibleworlds inwhichϕ is true. Further assume thatwith every atomic sentenceϕ we
have associated a (possibly empty) set of sentences that constitute the presuppositions
conventionally triggered by ϕ. Now, the rules of the dynamic semantics should tell us
when an update of a contextC with a sentenceϕ is defined, andwhat newcontextwould
be the result of the update. For atomic sentences we have the following Stalnaker-style
update rule:
5 At least, this entailment holds under a straightforward Hintikka-style analysis where propositional atti-
tudes are intensional operators, closed under logical consequence. However, as an anonymous reviewer
points out, there are some well-known counterexamples to the closure of desire attitudes (cf. Heim 1992,
p. 194 and references cited there). Interestingly, these counterexamples typically exploit precisely the kind
of dependencies between beliefs and desires that we also see in Karttunen’s puzzle. Hence, both Heim’s
solution to Karttunen’s puzzle and my own can deal with these counterexamples as well.
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(10) C + ϕ = C ∩ ϕ, if C ⊆ ψ for all presuppositions ψ of ϕ; undefined
otherwise.
Complex sentences update the contexts in two or more steps:
(11) a. C + ¬ϕ = C\(C + ϕ)
b. C + ϕ ∧ ψ = (C + ϕ) + ψ
Other logical connectives can be defined in terms of these in the usual way, e.g.
ϕ → ψ = ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
The update semantics given by (10) and (11) accounts for standard examples of
presupposition projection. For instance, let’s assume that the atomic sentence my
brother is bald presupposes I have a brother. According to (11a) an update with my
brother is not bald, C + ¬(my brother is bald), requires that we compute C+(my
brother is bald), and hence is only defined if that atomic update is defined. If we
identify the presuppositions of a complex sentence with its definedness conditions,
through (12b), it follows that the dynamic negation defined in (11a) does not affect
the presuppositions of an embedded constituent, i.e. negation functions as a hole.
(12) a. C satisfies ϕ iff C + ϕ = C
b. ϕ presupposes ψ iff for all C where C + ϕ is defined, C satisfies ψ
The semantics also correctly predicts filtering in conjunctions and conditionals. For
instance, C+(I have a brother∧my brother is bald) is defined whenever (i) C+(I have
a brother), call that set C ′, is defined, and (ii) C ′+(my brother is bald) is defined.
The former is an atomic update without presuppositional expressions, so C ′ is always
defined and contains only worlds where my brother is bald. The latter update does
involve a presupposition, but, given the first update, it is satisfied in its context C ′. So
the whole two-step update is always defined, meaning that the presupposition of the
second conjunct has been canceled.
Nowwe have to add attitude ascriptions. Heim’s starting point is the static Hintikka
(1969) semantics of belief as a modal operator, i.e. x believes that ϕ is true inw iff ϕ is
true in all of x’s doxastic alternatives (Dox(x, w) denotes the set of worlds compatible
with what x believes in w).
(13) BELaϕw = 1 iff Dox(aw,w) ⊆ ϕ
To make this dynamic, we should treat an update with a belief ascription as removing
worlds from C . Replacing the static notion of a proposition as a set of worlds with the
dynamic notion of satisfaction by a set of worlds, Heim proposes the following rule:
(14) C + BELaϕ =
{
w ∈ C Dox(aw,w) satisfies ϕ
}
This update is defined whenever the set of the agent’s doxastic alternatives satisfies
ϕ’s presuppositions. Reformulated in terms of projection: if ϕ presupposes ψ then
BELaϕ presupposes BELaψ .
The rule in (14) accounts for filtering in believe–believe sequences like (8a). Extend-
ing (14) to hope ascriptions by replacing Dox with Bul, the set of an agent’s buletic
alternatives, we derive: if ϕ presupposes ψ , then HOPEaϕ presupposes HOPEaψ .
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This would cover filtering in hope–hope sequences like (8b), but not in Karttunen’s
believe–hope sequence, (6). In fact, the presupposition we would then generate for the
second sentence in the Karttunen puzzle is that Sue hopes that Jane used to cheat on
her husband, which is already highly counterintuitive in its own right.
To remedy this, Heim replaces the underlying Hintikka semantics of desire with
a more sophisticated analysis in terms of a preference ranking on (sets of) possible
worlds, inspired by Stalnaker (1984). Instead of hope Heim analyzes want: wanting
that ϕ means that you prefer ϕ-worlds to not-ϕ worlds. That is, x wants that ϕ is true
iff x prefers any doxastic alternative where ϕ holds to any other doxastic alternative
where it doesn’t. Let X ≺w,a Y abbreviate that a in w prefers all worlds in X to any
world in Y .
(15) WANTaϕw = 1 iff (Dox(aw,w)∩ϕ) ≺aw,w (Dox(aw,w)∩¬ϕ)
In order to avoid a number of undesirable consequences (like closure under logical
consequence), Heim proposes some further refinements to (15). Later on, she also
proposes some modifications to capture counterfactual and factive desire predicates
(wish and be glad, respectively).6 Since all these issues are independent of Karttunen’s
presupposition puzzle, Iwill stickwith (15) and ignore the differences between hoping,
wanting and other desire attitudes.




w ∈ C (Dox(aw, ,w) + ϕ) ≺aw,w (Dox(aw,w) + ¬ϕ)
}
Looking at when the updates on the right hand side of the equation are defined we can
prove the following:
(17) if ϕ presupposes ψ , then WANTaϕ presupposes BELaψ .
Applied to the Karttunen example, this means that the second sentence presupposes
that Sue believes that Jane used to cheat on her husband. This seems like an intuitively
plausible inference. Moreover, after updating the original context with the first sen-
tence, this information about Jane’s belief will be satisfied. Hence the presupposition
of the second sentence is indeed filtered out by the first sentence, which was what we
set out to derive.
In sum, Heim demonstrates how an assumption about the semantics of desire, (15),
translated to a dynamic setting as (16), elegantly solves Karttunen’s puzzle about
presupposition projection in believe–desire sequences of ascriptions.
Along the way, Heim’s paper provides a novel semantics of desire ascriptions that
solves a number of non-presupposition-related problems. As amatter of fact, it is these
results that have proven the most influential. With her preference-based semantics
Heim paved the way for a number of recent publications in which the Hintikka-style
uniform analysis of attitude ascriptions is replaced with a more fine-grained classi-
fication and semantic analysis of different attitude verbs (Villalta 2009; Anand and
6 Heim doesn’t discuss hope. Cf. Anand and Hacquard (2013) for an analysis of hope that combines both
a preference component and a propositional one.
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Hacquard 2013; Rubinstein 2012). These recent developments take the static prefer-
ence ranking semantics in (15) as their point of departure for further refinements and
extensions, ignoring the dynamic version and its predictions related to presupposition
projection. However, like Heim I’m interested primarily in the dynamics of attitude
ascriptions. The crucial difference between my analysis and Heim’s is that while hers
depends on the preference ranking semantics for desire, for me its the hierarchical
structure of mental state representations that accounts for the relevant projection data.
2.3.2 Three objections
Now let me point out some of the shortcomings and limitations of Heim’s proposal
that the current account will overcome, as well as some more general limitations that
my proposal shares with Heim’s.
First, as Heim herself points out, her account makes the wrong predictions for
hope–hope sequences like (18).




On Heim’s account the presupposition of the second sentence is that John believes
that someone other than Sue will come. But this is not entailed by the first sentence, so
no satisfaction is predicted. As I will demonstrate in Sect. 5.4, my proposal correctly
predicts presupposition satisfaction (or rather, binding, as it is called in DRT) for (18),
and generally for any sequences7 of attitude ascriptions of a single type.
Second, Heim has great difficulty deriving the observation that presuppositions
often survive attitude embedding unscathed. On Heim’s proposal, Bill hopes that it
stopped raining presupposes that Bill believes it has been raining, not that it has been
raining. De re readings of definite description pose prima facie counterexamples to
Heim’s doxastic presuppositions:
(19) Mary thinks that her idiot boyfriend is a genius.
The presupposition generated byHeim is thatMary believes she has an idiot boyfriend,
which would be downright incompatible with the at issue content of the thought
ascribed to her.
Heim tries to turn this apparent defect into a virtue by arguing that examples like (19)
show the need for amechanism of de re construal that is independent of presupposition
projection. The literature indeed provides a wide range of suchmechanisms, including
intensional variables (Heim and von Fintel 2011) and syntactic res-movement (von
StechowandZimmermann2005).Heim suggests that it is this general de remechanism
7 And, of course, conjunctions. Analogous filtering in conditionals is problematic for both Heim and my
account. Consider If Harry wants to have a son, he wants his son to be the first pianist who can play the
Moonlight Sonata in less than six minutes (Geurts 1998, p. 563). As Geurts points out, Heim’s analysis
suffers from the “proviso problem” here, i.e., it predicts the seemingly nonsensical presupposition that if
he wants to have a son, he believes that he has one. To deal with such conditionals, my own account would
need a more sophisticated “attitude merge” operation than the one I provide in Sect. 5.2, or else borrow
Geurts’s idea that attitude ascriptions presuppose attitude contexts. For reasons of space I restrict attention
to simple discourse variants of the Karttunen puzzle.
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that is responsible for the observed tendency to interpret presuppositional content as if it
has projected out of the attitude in question, without the need for actual presupposition
projection. The common intuition that attitude verbs are holes is thus explained as a
tendency for construing presuppositional expressions de re.
As Geurts (1998, p. 568) rightly observes, this strategy seems to be overkill:
If presuppositions already have a natural tendency to float up from embedded
positions anyway, why should they need help from a mechanism for de re con-
strual? I take it that we should prefer a theory that is in a position to say that de
re interpretations are the outcome of the standard mechanisms of presupposition
projection.
I add that Romoli and Sudo (2009) have since offered a number of independent argu-
ments in favor of the presuppositional analysis of de re construal that Geurts suggests,8
showing that such an analysis actually makes better predictions than rival accounts
of the de re/de dicto distinction. Accordingly, in my analysis below, the mechanism
of de re construal is fully reduced to presupposition projection, making for a more
parsimonious and more empirically adequate analysis.9
Apart from appealing to de re construal Heim suggests another way to derive the
intuition that presuppositions project out of attitudes: an independently plausible “spill-
over” inference allows us to derive the presupposition that ϕ from the presupposition
that someone believes that ϕ. Geurts (1998, pp. 588–589) questions the intuitive valid-
ity of such a general inference pattern andmoreover shows that it would generate faulty
predictions for a sentence like (20b).
(20) a. John believes that it stopped raining.
b. Fred knows that John believes that it was raining.
Intuitively, (20a) presupposes that it was raining while (20b) does not. However, given
that know presupposes the truth of its complement and it stopped raining presupposes
that it was raining, Heim would generate the same presupposition for both, viz. that
John believes that it was raining. If we then appeal to the general spill-over principle
to get the desired result for (21a), why wouldn’t that apply to (20b) as well?
Summing up the second objection, Heim’s initial system generates only doxastic
presuppositions and therefore needs to be supplementedwith an additional mechanism
to derive the observed non-doxastic one. Both of the mechanisms she considers, de re
construal and spill-over, are ultimately unsatisfactory. In my analysis, only the simple
8 Geurts does not yet fully endorse a general reduction of de re to presupposition projection, as shown by
the following passage:
the distinction between de re and de dicto readings of belief reports is to be explicated, at least partly
in terms of scope. It seems to me, however, that the notions of scope and presupposition, similar
though they may be, should be strictly distinguished. (Geurts 1998, p. 566)
Ergo, according to Geurts, presupposition projection is to be strictly distinguished from de re construal,
since the latter is merely a form of scope assignment.
9 Cf. Maier (2011) for more on the advantages of this reduction.
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non-doxastic presupposition is generated, and when it projects out of the attitude this
gives rise to a de re interpretation.
My third andfinal objection toHeim’s analysis concerns its limited scope.Karttunen
already suggests that the phenomenon is quite general. Apart from the two verbs that
Heim considers, want and wish, the asymmetric satisfaction pattern extends to many
other attitude verbs10:
(21) a. John believes that Mary will come. He {hopes/doubts/suspects/fears} that
her sister will come too.
b. *John {hopes/doubts/suspects/fears} that Mary will come. He believes that
her sister will come too.
Arguably, the semantic interpretations of the verbs above all involve some pref-
erence or ordering component, so, we may be able to extend the original analysis.
However, the phenomenon also extends to attitude verbs that clearly lack an order-
ing component, i.e. what Anand and Hacquard (2013) call purely representational
attitudes:
(22) a. John believes that Mary will come to his party. Last night he
{dreamed/imagined} that her sister would come too.
b. *Last night John {dreamed/imagined} that Mary would come to his party.
He believes that her sister will come too.
c. Sue thinks her boyfriend is a genius. She pretends she’s a genius too.
d. *Sue pretends to be a genius. She thinks her boyfriend is a genius too.
These examples are problematic for Heim because she derivesKarttunen’s observation
directly from properties of the ordering semantics. My solution to Karttunen’s puzzle
does not rely on preference rankings and therefore can be straightforwardly extended
to representational attitudes, as I show in Sect. 5.4.
I should point out that there are many seemingly related observations of cross-
attitudinal presupposition satisfaction in the literature that neither Heim nor the current
proposal will account for. First, there are some cases in which a non-doxastic attitude
complement seems to bind a pronoun (a special case of presupposition resolution)
originating in a doxastic or other non-doxastic attitude complement.
(23) a. Susan wants a pet. She believes she will look after it.
[
Cresswell 1990, cited by Heim
]





These pose a genuine challenge for both Heim’s proposal and my own. Heim observes
that, somehow, the second ascription in such examples gets a conditional interpretation:
10 Note that factives (know, be happy, be unaware, regret), which entail (or presuppose) the truth of their
complement, don’t show this asymmetry. This is because a factive in the first sentence would allow regular,
global satisfaction of the believe embedded presupposition. In addition, ascriptions of attitudes that entail
or strongly imply belief (promise, say, be convinced that, remember) may also be expected to behave
symmetrically with respect to believe.
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she believes that if she has a pet, she will look after it. A proper account of such
interpretations and their relation with E-type pronouns and/or modal subordination
will have to wait for another occasion.
All examples so far featured two attitudes ascribed to the same agent. This appears
to be a necessary prerequisite for Karttunen-style satisfaction, as shown by the contrast
in (24):
(24) Context: Mary knows the Sue won’t come. John is more optimistic.
John believes that Sue will come. {He/*Mary} hopes that Sue’s sister
will come too.
Heim’s account, like mine, correctly predicts that John’s belief cannot satisfy a pre-
supposition triggered inside an attitude ascribed to Mary. But there are well known
examples of “intentional identity”, where pronouns do appear to be bound across
different attitudes of different agents. Consider Geach’s (1967) infamous Hob-Nob
sentences:
(25) Hob believes a witch blighted his cow. Nob {believes/hopes/fears/doubts} that
she killed his sow.
There is no denying that there are strong similarities between this phenomenon and
Karttunen’s puzzle. Both involve unexpected presupposition satisfaction across mul-
tiple attitude ascriptions in a discourse. However, as the contrast in (24) shows,
multi-agent satisfaction is not as generally available as Karttunen’s single agent vari-
ety. I hypothesize that some additional, independent information sharing mechanisms
are responsible for the Hob–Nob effect. Hence, like Heim, I restrict attention to single
agent cases.
3 Representing mental states
In this section I propose a general theory of the representation of mental states. One of
the central assumptions built into the proposed semantics of attitudes is an asymmetric
dependence of desire and other attitudes on beliefs. Integrating the resulting theory of
mental state representations into a dynamic account of presupposition resolution will
then yield the solution for Karttunen’s puzzle.
3.1 Modes of attitude in DRT
One of the key inspirations for the present Kamp’s (1990, also see Kamp et al. 2003)
analysis of the structure ofmental representation. The leading intuition behindKamp’s
proposal is that propositional attitudes are complex states consisting of entity repre-
sentations and interconnected beliefs, desires, intentions and other attitudes. In this
section I propose a radical simplification of Kamp’s model designed specifically to
capture the parasitic dependence of non-doxastic attitudes.
Concretely, say I see a cup filled with a dark substance here on the table in front
of me on my desk. I believe it’s coffee, and I hope it’s still warm. Moreover, say, I
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imagine it’s whiskey, and I intend to pick up the cup and drink from it. My mental
state at this point could be represented like this:
(26)
x y z i n
coffee(x) cup(y) desk(z)
x in y y on z
x in front of i at n




i pick up y
i drink x
In DRT terminology, the global context in (26) represents my beliefs, in this case based
primarily on my perceptual acquaintance with my surroundings. The boxes labeled
DES, IMG and INT represent my desire, imagination, and intention, respectively.
Other labeled boxes could represent further attitudes, like fear, doubt, dream etc. I will
refer to formulas like (26) as mental state descriptions.
I will give the exact syntax and semantics in Sect. 3.2, but let me highlight in
advance the innovation crucial to solvingKarttunen’s puzzle: all non-doxastic attitudes
are represented as embedded inside the belief.11 Given the standard DRT notion of
accessibility this captures the asymmetric dependence of non-doxastic attitudes on
beliefs. The dependence of desire on belief, for instance, is illustrated in (26), where the
discourse referent x in the desire box is bound globally, in the belief box. Dependence
in the other direction is not possible, discourse referents introduced inside an embedded
attitude level cannot bind occurrences in the global belief representation. To illustrate
this, imagine that you want to buy a new bike without having a particular one in mind.
In a description of yourmental state, the desired bike would be existentially introduced
in the universe of the embedded subDRS describing your desire. Such an embedded
discourse referent is accessible to further desires, but not to other attitudes. This means
I can represent the desire that it—the desired bike—be red, but not the belief that it
is better than my old one. This accessibility limitation accurately reflects a property
of our mental capacities, viz. that non-doxastic attitudes are parasitic on beliefs. This
will be the basis for explaining the corresponding linguistic asymmetry between belief
and desire ascriptions that we observed in Sect. 2.2:




b. *John hopes that Mary will come. He believes that Sue will come too.
11 Note that the embedded DRSs in (26) are not embedded under a semantic operator: DES is a label, not
an intensional operator. This type of complex condition, involving an embedded DRS but no embedding
operator, is familiar fromHunter’s DRT analysis of indexicality (cf. in particular Hunter (2014), Sect. 2.2.2).
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3.2 Interpreting mental state descriptions
This section presents a model-theoretic interpretation for the mental state descriptions
from Sect. 3.1. In other words, the goal is to specify under what conditions someone’s
mental state is accurately described by a structure like (26).
Let’s start from the beginning. The general idea is as follows: to determine whether
a given mental state description accurately represents a given individual’s mental state
we compute a semantic interpretation of the mental state description and then see if
that matches the actual mental state. This presupposes that our model provides us with
the mental states of individuals. But what exactly are mental states? What kind of
set-theoretic objects can we plausibly add to our models for this purpose?
There’s a range of possibilities on offer in the literature. On the one extreme there is
Asher (1986)who assumes thatmental states just areDRS-like syntactic structures. By
contrast, Kamp et al. (2003) offer so-called “Information StateBasedAttitudinal States
(ISBAS)”, which are still highly structured but more genuinely semantic entities (in
the sense of involving possible worlds and individuals rather than formulas). I adopt a
simpler and more traditional view, based on the idea that an agent’s beliefs correspond
to a set of possible worlds (Hintikka 1962; Stalnaker 1984).
Following Lewis’s (1979) analysis of de se belief, I’ll replace possible worlds with
contexts. Context are modeled here as triples of a world, an agent and a time: c =
〈wc, ac, tc〉 ∈ C . This means the model provides functions Dox , and Bul, mapping an
agent at aworld to the set of contexts compatiblewithwhat that agent there believes and
desires, respectively. For ease of presentation I’ll focus on these two attitudes below.
Formally, a belief–desire model then looks like this: M = 〈D,W, T,C, Dox, Bul, I〉
where C ⊆ W × D × T, Dox, Bul : D × W → P(C) and I is an interpretation
function mapping predicates to appropriate sets of semantic entities, relative to an
intensional parameter.
How should we interpret a mental state description K in such a way that we can say
it does or does not match an agent a’s attitudes as given by the sets Dox(a, w) and
Bul(a, w)? To answer this question I’ll define both the belief-proposition expressed
by K and the desire-proposition expressed by K , both as sets of contexts. But first
let’s rehearse the standard syntax and semantics for DRT.
Syntactically, a DRS K is a pair, 〈U (K ),Con(K )〉, consisting of a “universe”
of discourse referents (x,y, . . .), and a set of conditions. Conditions can be atomic
(walk(x)) or complex (¬K )—labeled conditions (DES-K ) are not part of standard
DRT and will be treated differently, see below.
The central notion of Kamp’s (1981) DRT semantics is that of a verifying embed-
ding, which is a partial function from the set of discourse referents to the model’s
domain D. For our current purposes we need to add an intensional parameter. Since
we take doxastic and buletic alternatives to be contexts rather than possible worlds,
we’ll use contexts as our intensional parameter. An embedding g verifies a DRS K in
c iff it verifies all conditions of K . Notation:
(28) g |c K iff for all ψ ∈ Con(K ): g |c ψ .
Condition verification is defined by cases. For example:
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(29) a. g |c P(x1, . . . xn) iff 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ Ic(P)
b. g |c ¬K ′ iff there is no h ⊇ g with Dom(h) = Dom(g) ∪ U (K ′) and
h |c K ′.
We then say that a DRS K is true if there exists a verifying embedding g with
Dom(g) = U (K ).
To deal with the special indexical discourse referents i and n I rely on Kamp and
Reyle’s (1993) notion of an (external) anchor.Anchors are partial embeddings intended
tomodelKripkean rigid designation inDRTbyfixing the reference of certain discourse
referents. Formally, we define truth in c relative to an anchor f that maps i and n,
whenever they occur, to the context’s agent and time coordinates, respectively.
(30) K  fc = 1 iff there is an embedding g ⊇ f such that Dom(g) = U (K )
and g |c K , and, moreover, g(i) = ac (if i ∈ U (K )) and g(n) = tc (if
n ∈ U (K )).
By abstraction we can now trivially define also the (centered) proposition expressed
by K relative to f as the set of contexts in which K is true relative to f .
(31) K  f =
{
c ∈ C K  fc = 1
}
As a useful shorthand we define unanchored propositions: K  = K ∅
To apply this basic DRT semantics to mental state descriptions we start with some
additional notation to pick out the labeled subDRSs of a mental state description K .
Let KDES be the embedded subDRS labeled DES and KBEL the global DRS of K , i.e.




Let’s zoom in on the belief mode first. We define the belief-proposition expressed
by mental state description K as the set of contexts in which there is an unanchored
verifying embedding of KBEL. We then say that K captures the beliefs of an agent if
its belief-proposition is true in all her doxastic alternatives:
(33) K captures the beliefs of a in w iff Dox(a, w) ⊆ KBEL.
Before turning to desire and other attitudes, let’s verify that this works with the










According to our semantics, K coffee captures a’s beliefs in w iff for all c ∈ Dox(a, w)
there is an embedding of the universe of K coffee that verifies all the global conditions
in c, i.e. an embedding g : {x,y,i} → D with g(i) = ac and g(x) ∈ Ic(coffee),
g(y) ∈ Ic(cup), 〈g(x), g(y)〉 ∈ Ic(in), and 〈g(x), g(i)〉 ∈ Ic(in front of). In
words, K coffee captures the beliefs of an agent a in w if in all doxastic alternatives c
there exists a pair of individuals x and y such that x is coffee, y is a cup that contains
x , and x is in front of the agent of c. This is exactly the result we should expect.
If we try to extend the semantics of belief to desire we immediately run into trouble.
(35) K captures the desires of a in w iff Bul(a, w) ⊆ KDES [to be revised]
Consider K coffee again. Since K coffeeDES contains a free variable x there can never be an
unanchored verifying embedding of K coffeeDES on its own. We need an anchor to fix the
reference of x, but where do we get the anchor from? The idea behind our representa-
tion format was that desire is parasitic on belief, i.e., we only have desires relative to
our beliefs. The x that is desired to be warm is supposed to be the coffee introduced
in the belief layer, K coffeeBEL. So somehow the anchor for interpreting K
coffee
DES should be
determined by an interpretation of K coffeeBEL. We can build this idea into our semantics by
(i) introducing in the model a primitive parasitic notion of buletic alternatives, Bul∗,
which gives the agent’s buletic alternatives relative to a context the agent believes
to inhabit, and (ii) comparing these buletic alternatives with the desire-proposition
only relative to the belief contexts and embeddings that verify the global belief
layer.
(36) K captures the desires of a in w iff for all c ∈ Dox(a, w) and all f with
f |c KBEL, Bul∗(a, w, c) ⊆ KDES f
The new primitive notion Bul∗, describing an agent’s “belief-relative buletic alterna-
tives”, requires some explanation. It is modeled after Ninan’s (2008) two-dimensional
analysis of imagination.12 The motivation for the extra context parameter is that we
need ourmodel to give us a set of buletic alternatives relative towhat the agent believes.
More precisely, Bul∗(a, w, c) is the set of contexts compatible with what the agent a
inw would desire if her belief set were the singleton {c}. Ninan provides the following
intuitive heuristic for thinking about such a belief-relative attitude (I’m paraphrasing
a passage from his 2008:43–44). Imagine you’re agent a at w. Let c be one of your
doxastic alternatives. Now imagine that c is your only doxastic alternative, i.e., you’re
convinced that you inhabit context c—free of any uncertainty. In that situation, if you
consider a c′ to be compatible with your desires, then c′ ∈ Bul∗(a, w, c). What (36)
then does is quantify over the doxastic alternatives c and look at the buletic alternatives
relative to each of those c’s. Moreover, for each c we use the verifying embedding that
verifies K coffeeBEL in c as an anchor for computing the desire-proposition.
12 I should point out that, worried about the possibility of an agent having a de re attitude without any
internal, uniquely identifying mental description, Ninan himself rejects this two-dimensional approach in
favor of his multi-centered worlds framework. Interestingly, the rejected approach, which I adapt to my
DRT framework here, has also been picked up in other work, such as Anand (2011).
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Applied to the coffee example again, K coffee captures a’s desires if for every doxastic
alternative c and f such that f (x) is an amount of coffee in c, f (y) is a cup containing
that coffee in c, f (i) = ac, and f (i) sees f (x) in front of her, Bul∗(a, w, c) ⊆
K coffeeDES
 f . That is, it has to be the case that for any f and c as above, if a’s beliefs
were given by {c}, a would want f (x) to be warm. This seems to capture precisely
the idea that a wants the believed coffee to be warm.
Putting belief and desire together we can define when a belief–desire mental state
description captures the mental state of an agent:
(37) K captures the mental state of a in w iff
a. Dox(a, w) ⊆ KBEL, and
b. for all c ∈ Dox(a, w) and f with f |c KBEL, Bul∗(a, w, c) ⊆ KDES f
In the current section I have provided a model-theoretic interpretation for mental
state descriptions. More specifically, I have defined when a belief–desire mental state
description captures the actual mental state of an agent in terms of that agent’s sets of
doxastic and buletic alternatives as given by amodel. In spelling out the details it turned
out that belief played a rather different role than desire. In the eventual definition, the
parasitic nature of desire that we modeled representationally as DRS embedding is
also accounted for in the semantics.
The belief–desire semantics presented above can be straightforwardly extended to
other non-doxastic attitudes by treating them analogously to desire as belief parasites.
I will briefly return to the attitude of imagination toward the end of the paper, in Sect.
5.4, but in the meantime I will continue to focus on beliefs and desires.
4 From attitudes to ascriptions
4.1 Representing attitudes in discourse
We’ve used DRT to represent an agent’s mental state, but of course DRT can also be
used to represent the information conveyed by a discourse. The DRS below represents
a context where there is a certain salient individual named John who is said to be a








With the framework introduced in the previous section we can represent, for instance,
the mental state of John when he sees someone on TV whom he believes to be an








Now, the fact that John has such a mental state is just another fact about John, a fact
that we might want to communicate, or that might otherwise have become part of the
common ground. The obvious next step is therefore to add a condition to DRT that









The semantics of Att is given by definition (37) above, via the following condition
verification rule:
(41) f |c Att(x) :K iff K captures the mental state of f (x) in wc.
The leading question in the remainder of the paper is now, how dowe systematically
arrive at representations like (40) from interpreting a given sentence in a given dis-
course context? The answer will make use of a presupposition theory that is designed
for use with DRT. I will show that the resulting theory naturally solves the Karttunen
puzzle.
4.2 Presupposition as anaphora
Van der Sandt’s (1992) Presupposition-as-Anaphora theory accounts for the full pro-
jection behavior associated with presuppositions in a DRT framework, and is therefore
ideally suited for our current purposes. A fundamental characteristic ofVan der Sandt’s
account is that sentence interpretation proceeds in two stages. In the construction stage,
a sentence is parsed and translated compositionally into a so-called preliminary DRS,
i.e., an underspecified logical form, where presuppositions are represented as dashed
DRS boxes. Next, in the resolution stage, this preliminary DRS is merged with a
context DRS, i.e., a logical representation of the current common ground, and then
the presuppositions are resolved, either by binding to an accessible antecedent, or by
accommodation.
Let me illustrate this presupposition-driven dynamic account of discourse interpre-
tation with a concrete example. Consider the following discourse, uttered in a context
where farmer John is already an established topic of conversation.
(42) John bought a donkey. His wife doesn’t like it.
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The first sentence contains one presupposition trigger, John, which presupposes the
existence of someone named thus. For simplicity we’ll assume that the context DRS
provides a single discourse referent representing John. Interpretation starts bymerging















Now we look for suitable antecedents for the presupposition. The y from John can be
bound to the globally given x. Unifying these two discourse referents, y = x, gives





This output serves as input for the interpretation of the second sentence,which contains
three presuppositions (his wife is decomposed as the wife of he, a double presupposi-
tion). We merge the new context DRS, (44), with the new preliminary DRS and then














 w = x








There is no suitable antecedent for the presupposed wife to bind to, so this last remain-
ing presupposition must be accommodated. Global accommodation in this case means
that we add the existence of a wifeu ofx to the information conveyed by the discourse.








By applying the DRT semantics of Sect. 3.2 we get the truth conditions of this DRS:
(46) is true if there is someone named John who has a wife, and who bought a donkey,
and, moreover, this wife of John’s doesn’t like that donkey.
This example should suffice as a demonstration of the construction and resolution
algorithms which model dynamic utterance interpretation in the DRT framework. For
more details on DRS construction and presupposition resolution I refer to van der
Sandt (1992), Geurts (1999), and Bos (2003). Below I apply this framework to the
interpretation of attitude ascriptions containing presupposition triggers.
4.3 Beyond the de re/de dicto distinction
At the beginning of this section I introduced the Att predicate by which we can
represent that someone has a certain mental state. Naturally we’ll want to use that
if we are to model the interpretation of natural language attitude ascriptions, such
as those in the Karttunen puzzle. Before tackling the dependencies in a sequence of
attitude ascriptions (as in that puzzle), let’s consider first a single ascription.
(47) John hopes to date the winner of America’s Next Top Model.
This is a classic example of a report that allows both a de dicto (John wants to date
whoever wins) and a de re reading (John wants to date a certain person, whom we
characterize as the winner, regardless of whether or not he is aware of this fact about
her). We’ll see that the proposed combination of presupposition theory and parasitic
mental state descriptions sheds new light on this classical de re/de dicto ambigu-
ity.
Assume a context DRS where John is represented globally. The composition-
ally generated preliminary DRS representation of (47) contains two presuppositions,
triggered by the definite NPs John and the winner of ANTM. I represent the
hopes that construction as the ascription of a mental state with a global belief
level representing the de se center (i), and a desire compartment represent-























The global discourse level says that there exists someone named John who is in a
certain mental state. This mental state is described as containing a representation of
John’s self and an attitude of desire, with the content that John himself dates the as
yet unspecified winner.
In contrast tomore traditionalDRTanalyses of belief ascriptions likemyown (Maier
2010), we have not two but three levels of embedding. Given the presupposition-as-
anaphora theory these constitute a projection path of three possible resolution sites
for the presupposition triggered by the definite description. At none of these sites
do we find a discourse referent that could plausibly bind the presupposition. So we
have to consider only accommodation options. For ease of presentation I will dis-
cuss the different accommodation outputs in the order from local to global. Note
however that, all things being equal, global accommodation is preferred over more
local options (cf. Geurts 1999). In any case, we’ll see that the combination of pre-
supposition theory and parasitic attitudes generates three truth-conditionally distinct
readings for our example. These correspond to the two traditional categories of de
dicto and de re, as well as a new one in between, which, following the terminol-
ogy of Yanovich (2011), we will refer to as de credito. To paraphrase, John wants
to date the person that he believes to have won—a reading that the sentence readily
allows.
4.3.1 A pure de dicto resolution
Themost local resolution option for the presupposition in (49) is local accommodation,
where the presupposition does not project at all but remains in situ, as if it were at
issue content. Local accommodation is generally dispreferred, but available in the right
context, especially for descriptively rich presuppositions like the winner of America’s












With our semantics of Att, this DRS can be shown to represent a reading where there
is a contextual John, and in every belief context, the contexts compatible with what the
center desires (relative to that belief context) are such that there is an ANTM winner
that he dates.
4.3.2 A de credito resolution
The second accommodation option puts the presupposition in the global part within








In the resulting reading the attitude ascribed to John is not de re, as we assert no
relation between John and any other external individual. All we are ascribing to John
is (i) the belief that there exists someone who won, and (ii) the desire that he dates
him or her. Since the desire referentially depends on the belief, we might call this a
parasitic de dicto reading, or a de credito ascription.
4.3.3 A de re resolution
The next level to consider would be the global DRS, outside the attitude. Following the
presuppositional analysis of the de re/de dicto distinction (Romoli and Sudo 2009),







Note that this simple wide scope representation of de re suffers from Quinean (1956)
double vision problems. To fix this we could follow my (2010) presuppositional adap-
tation of the Kaplan (1968)/Lewis (1979) analysis of de re attitudes as involving
acquaintance-basedmodes of presentation. But since the double vision issue is orthog-
onal to the Karttunen puzzle, I’ll stick with the simple representation in (52).13
13 The central assumption of my 2010 analysis is that when a presupposition moves out of the scope
of an attitude operator it triggers the introduction of an acquaintance variable inside the attitude, and an
accompanying acquaintance presupposition outside of it. Adapting this procedure to the parasitic mental
state framework above gives us the following intermediate representation, at the point in the resolution
when the winner crosses the global attitude box:
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In this section I incorporated the mental state descriptions from the previous section
into a theory of attitude ascriptions in DRT. Applying the analysis to a simple hope
ascription brought out a third reading between de dicto and de re: the de credito. The
derivation of this reading relies on the structural analysis of hope as a parasitic attitude,
distinct from, but referentially dependent on, belief.
5 Updating attitudes in discourse
We’re almost ready to tackle Karttunen’s puzzle, i.e., how can a belief ascription bind
a presupposition triggered inside a different attitudinal embedding?
(53) Sue thinks that Jane has been cheating on her husband. She hopes that Jane




In this section I formulate and motivate one last piece of machinery and apply the
complete theory to (53), and to some examples that were identified as problematic for
Heim’s alternative solution in Sect. 2.3.
5.1 Taking stock
In the previous section I’ve demonstrated how to interpret attitude ascriptions contain-
ing a presupposition trigger. On the basis of that mechanism we’d interpret the first
sentence of (53) as ascribing to Sue a mental state in which the global belief context







So far this is just applying the straightforward presuppositional analysis of de re, as












Global accommodation of the acquaintance presupposition R and the res presupposition y yields an output
that says there is a relation R and a winner y, and R holds between John and y and in John’s doxastic
alternatives there is a person he bears R to and whom he dates in his buletic alternatives. I leave further




advantage of the present proposal becomes apparent onlywhenwe hit the non-doxastic
attitude in the second sentence.
In the representation of the second sentence, She hopes Jane stops cheating on
him, the mental state ascribed to Sue involves a desire compartment, so we have one
extra embedding level. There are three familiar presupposition triggers (she, Jane,
and him), which bind globally to their attitude external antecedents (Sue, Jane, and
Jane’s husband) represented in the context, (54). The fourth trigger, stop cheating, is











At this point in the derivation we are representing Sue as being in a mental state which
is characterized in two separate ways: (i) she believes there’s an event of Jane cheating
on her husband, and (ii) she desires that Jane puts an end to the presupposed event of
cheating on her husband.
The final remaining presupposition in (55), the presupposed cheating event trig-
gered by stop cheating, cannot directly bind to the cheating event in the first attitude
box as material inside the first attitude box is structurally inaccessible to anything in
the second. However, as described in Sect. 4.3, there are in principle three accommoda-
tion options. Local accommodation/pure de dicto is ruled out because it entails rather
implausibly that Sue wants Jane to cheat on her husband (and then also stop that cheat-
ing). Global accommodation/de re is ruled out because it entails that there is an actual
cheating event, while all we know is that Sue believes that there is such an event. Inter-
mediate accommodation/de credito does give a plausible interpretation for the second
sentence of (53): Sue believes that there is a cheating event and hopes that it stops.Com-
bined with the first sentence this amounts to a representation of the whole discourse











According to the first mental state description in (56) Sue believes that there is a
cheating, and according to the second she believes that there is a cheating while
hoping, relative to that belief, that it will stop.
This output is superior to what a simple analysis of attitudes as distinct intensional
operators could deliver because it allows us to avoid the implausible de re and (pure)
de dicto interpretations for the second sentence in favor of a much more plausible de
credito resolution. Nonetheless, the result above doesn’t quite capture the intuition that
the content of the belief complement satisfies or binds a presupposition triggered in
the subsequent hope complement. Rather, the second ascription is in effect interpreted
independently of the first. We could derive the exact same de credito reading for the
second sentence in isolation. This may be defensible in this particular case. Perhaps
the second sentence when uttered in isolation does indeed have such a de credito
interpretation. However, the reliance on accommodation becomes truly problematic
with examples involving accommodation-resistant triggers like too, as discussed in
Sect. 2.2:




The current analysis could only derive the acceptability of (57) by invoking accommo-
dation of the presupposition triggered by too. But by allowing accommodation in this
way we would incorrectly predict that the second half of (57) would also be acceptable
in isolation.
Below I smooth out this final wrinkle by proposing and motivating an extension of
the DRT merge operation that essentially allows us to merge mental state descriptions
along with global discourse representations.
5.2 Merging attitudes
I propose an extension of the DRS merge operation to embedded mental state rep-
resentations. The idea is to treat a sequence of ascriptions of attitudes to x not just
as a sequence of global updates on the common ground, but also as a sequence of
updates on the complex mental state representation that is being ascribed to x .15
More precisely, I add an attitude merging operation to the DRT resolution algo-
rithm. Resolution still starts by merging the preliminary DRS with the context DRS.
Then, presupposition resolution starts. If at some point in the process of resolving
presuppositions we find two attitude ascriptions to the same individual, we merge
those into a single Att condition before we continue the resolution. More pre-
cisely, I propose to add the following attitude merge operation to the resolution
algorithm:















KBEL ⊕ K ′BEL
DES– KDES ⊕ K ′DES
…
The attitude merge operation combines the two partial representations of x’s mental
state into a single more complete one. This captures the idea that a speaker can use a
sequence of attitude ascriptions to dynamically represent the single complex mental
state of an individual. Attitude merging opens up a range of new resolution options
for attitude embedded presuppositions—precisely the ones we need for finally solving
Karttunen’s puzzle.
5.3 Solving Karttunen’s puzzle
Now return to Karttunen’s puzzle. Let’s go back to (55), i.e., the point in the derivation
where we had two independent attitude ascriptions to Sue, with an unresolved presup-
position in the second. Instead of accommodating a new cheating inside the second












We can then trivially bind the prima facie problematic presupposition that Jane was





The final output (60) that results from processing the two-sentence discourse in
(53) correctly ascribes to Sue a mental state in which she believes of Jane that she
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cheated on her husband and then hopes, relative to that belief, that she will stop that
cheating.
The two innovations required to derive this solution to Karttunen’s puzzle are (i)
the idea that attitude ascriptions are interpreted as partial descriptions of a subject’s
complex mental state (which may be composed of various attitudes among which
belief plays a special role); and (ii) the idea that the distinct partial descriptions of
someone’s mental state, as given by a sequence of attitude descriptions in a discourse,
should be dynamicallymerged into a singlemore complete description of that subject’s
mental state.
5.4 Parasitic attitudes versus Heim (1992)
In Sect. 2.3 I discussed Heim’s (1992) alternative solution to Karttunen’s puzzle. I
identified three objections and promised that my own solution would do better. It is
now time to make good on that promise.
The first objection was that Heim’s analysis fails to account for cases of cross-
attitudinal satisfaction in hope–hope sequences.




On the account proposed here we use the attitude merge operation defined in Sect. 5.2
to merge our preliminary representation of the second hope ascribed to John with the
representation of the first. Hence, the information that Mary will come is accessible
for the presupposition triggered by Sue will come too. More specifically, directly after
merging the attitudes, John’s desire is described as in (62), where too is analyzed along
the lines of van der Sandt and Geurts (2001) as triggering the complex presupposition
on the right (i.e., there is an event of cominge′′ whose agentw is some salient individual
other than the subject, Sue (z)).









The presuppositions triggered by too can thus locally bind within KDES: w = m′ and
e′′ = e, which accounts for the observation.
My second objection to Heimwas that her analysis lacks an account of the intuition
that presuppositions tend to escape from attitude embeddings. Without additional
assumptions, her account predicts only doxastic presuppositions. This is problematic
for (63):






Instead of the presupposition that Mary has an idiot boyfriend, Heim derives the
unlikely presupposition that Mary thinks she has an idiot boyfriend. As argued in
Sect. 2.3, the additional mechanisms that Heim suggests in order to fix this, de re
construal and spill-over, are unconvincing.
In the current account all presuppositions “float up”. Presuppositions triggered
inside an attitude embedding will therefore typically escape that embedding, unless
they are bound within the attitude (as in Karttunen’s puzzle). When they do, we get a















My third objection was that Heim’s solution to Karttunen’s puzzle relies on a
preference ranking semantics of desire, so it cannot be straightforwardly extended to
account for similar behaviors with ascriptions of representational attitudes, like dream
or imagine, that don’t have a preference semantics.
(65) John believes that Mary will come to his party. Last night he {dreamed/




The current analysis relies on a more general aspect of the internal logical structure of
mental states. As indicated in Sect. 3.1 the parasitic nature of desire extends to other
non-doxastic attitudes, which immediately accounts for the kind of cross-attitudinal
presupposition binding we see in (65). To make this precise we first have to add new
labeled attitude representations to our mental state descriptions. I take it that just like
we can have desires that are grounded in our beliefs we can also imagine or dream
things about entities we merely believe to exist.16 But not the other way around: if
I imagine eating ice cream I can’t strictly speaking believe about that figment of my
imagination that it is cold. We see the same asymmetry in the linguistic domain in
the contrast between (65) and the version with the attitude verbs switched, i.e., (22b)
from Sect. 2.3.2. In other words, like desire, imagination and dreaming are parasitic
on belief. Hence, I propose to represent these new parasitic attitudes at the same level
as desires, embedded within the global belief box.
For the interpretation of (65) this means that, at the derivation stage after applying
attitude merge and binding her to Mary (m), we have:
















In this representation, the believed coming (e) of Mary (m) is a suitable and accessible
antecedent for the presupposition triggered by too: e′′ = e and z = m. The proposed
extension to imagination thus allows us to derive the right reading for (66).
To complete the extensionwe still have to say how to interpret this newmodemodel-
theoretically. Mimicking the parasitic interpretation of desire in Sect. 3.2 gives:
(67) K captures the imagination of a in w iff for all c ∈ Dox(a, w) and f with
f |c KBEL: Imgn∗(a, w, c) ⊆ KIMGN  f [cf. (36)]
For an independent motivation of the notion Imgn∗(a, w, c), the set of imagination
alternatives of a in w relative to c as doxastic alternative, see also Ninan’s (2008) two-
dimensional analysis of imagination. Further refinements, more in-depth comparisons,
and similar extensions for other parasitic attitudes I leave for future research.17
6 Conclusion
This paper offers a new way of interpreting linguistic reports of attitudes other than
belief. Using Karttunen’s puzzle as a guiding example, I have developed an analysis
17 As suggested by an anonymous referee it might be worthwhile to explore a modification of Heim’s
proposal that incorporates Ninan’s two-dimensional analysis to counter this third objection. That is, can we
perhaps predict filtering in believe–imagine sequences simply by replacing Heim’s preferential semantics
for desirewith a two-dimensional semantics for imagining in terms of Imgn∗?Concretely, a straightforward
combination of Heim and Ninan would lead to the following update rule:
(i) C + IMGNaϕ =
{
w ∈ C for all c ∈ Dox(a, w): Imgn∗(a, w, c) satisfies ϕ}
This update rule imposes the following definedness conditions:
(ii) C + IMGNaϕ is defined iff for all w ∈ C , c ∈ Dox(a, w) : Imgn∗(a, w, c) + ϕ is defined.
From this we can derive the following projection behavior:
(iii) if ϕ presupposes ψ , then ‘John imagines that ϕ’ presupposes that John imagines, relative to all his
belief worlds, that ψ .
This predicts filtering in imagine–imagine sequences, but fails to capture the crucial Karttunen-style filtering
that can be observed in believe–imagine sequences like (65).
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in which a sequence of multiple attitude ascriptions can be seen as incrementally
providing a representation of someone’s complex mental state.
My account starts with an analysis of the structure and interpretation of mental
states. FromKamp (1990) I take theDRT framework as away to representmental states
as consisting of different, interrelated attitude compartments. From Asher (1987),
Heim (1992), Maier (2006), Ninan (2008), and Yanovich (2011) I take the insight
that non-doxastic attitudes are asymmetrically dependent on belief. Accordingly, I
represent an agent’s beliefs as a global DRS context in which all other attitudes are
embedded. In spelling out the model-theoretic interpretation of the resulting mental
state descriptions, I incorporate a specific semantics designed for parasitic imagination
by Ninan.
With the representation and interpretation of mental states in place, the next step is
to incorporate it in a semantics for attitude ascriptions in natural language. Here, I take
as a point of departure the presuppositional analysis of belief reports as defended by
Geurts (1998), Romoli and Sudo (2009), and Maier (2010). Combining this with the
complex mental state descriptions leads us to redraw the de re/de dicto distinction: For
ascriptions of attitudes other than belief there arises a parasitic or de credito reading,
between the classic de re and de dicto.
As a last step on the way to solving Karttunen’s puzzle I turn to the dynamics
of attitude ascriptions. Karttunen’s example shows not only that desire ascription is
parasitic on belief ascription, but also that a sequence of attitude reports may be used
to ascribe a single complex mental state to a subject, rather than just to ascribe a series
of independent attitudes. I incorporated this dynamic aspect of attitude ascriptions into
the presupposition resolution algorithm in the form of an attitude merging operation.
The paper shows that Karttunen’s puzzle disappears once we recognize (i) the
parasitic nature of desire and other non-doxastic attitudes, and (ii) the dynamics of
attitude reports. Moreover, it shows explicitly how to incorporate these insights into a
fully general, conservative, and explicit semantics of attitude ascriptions in discourse.
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